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ABSTRACT 
 
A range of studies have shown that performance is typically higher in organisations 
with employee share ownership (ESO) schemes in place.  Many possible causal 
mechanisms explaining this relationship have been suggested. These include a 
reduction in labour turnover, synergies with other forms of productivity-enhancing 
communication and participation schemes, and synergies with employer-provided 
training.  This paper empirically assesses these potential linkages using data from the 
2004 and 2011 British Workplace Employment Relations Surveys, and provides 
comparisons with earlier analyses conducted on the 1990 and 1998 versions of the 
survey.  Substantial differences are found between the 2004 and 2011 results: a 
positive relationship between ESO and workplace productivity and financial 
performance, observed in 2004, is no longer present in 2011.  In both years, ESO is 
found to have no clear relationship with labour turnover, and there is no significant 
association between turnover and performance. There is, however, a positive 
moderating relationship with downward communication schemes in 2004 and in 2011 
in the case of labour productivity.  There is no corresponding relationship for upward 
involvement schemes.  Finally, there is weak evidence of a moderating relationship 
with training between ESO and financial performance in 2004, but this is not found in 
2011.  Overall, the results are only partially supportive of extant theory and its various 
predictions, and the relationship between ESO and performance seems to have 
weakened over time.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Tom Redman was very sceptical about the power of financial participation schemes, 
and employee share-ownership in particular, to leverage higher organisational 
performance. His view was that, at the very least, such schemes needed to be part of a 
coherent HRM package to have any chance of improving the organisational bottom 
line. Our attempts at trying to convince him that he was, perhaps, a little overly 
sceptical were typically met with a request to show him the evidence, much of which 
he found less than compelling. Unearthing new material on this relationship has 
therefore motivated much of our work. Every nugget of information that suggested 
that maybe financial participation mattered was seized on to present to Tom on the 
next occasion we had the pleasure of spending time in his company. Our discussions 
with him undoubtedly made us more circumspect in our support for a set of practices 
that we felt, in principle, should help organisations achieve their goals, and more 
discriminating in our approach to their analysis. This paper is the result of our latest 
work at this coal-face. 
 
Recent years have seen the advent of a wide range of worker-focused, holistic 
approaches by firms in search of improved competitive performance in their product 
markets (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Paauwe 2004; Whitfield and Poole 1997). 
Amongst these practices, employee share-ownership (ESO) has been accorded a key 
role in the process of leveraging improved performance via human resource 
management. It is seen as encouraging employees to identify more closely with their 
employing organisations, taking on board their values more fully, and thereby making 
a stronger contribution to their continued development (Blasi et al. 2016; Kurtulus 
and Kruse 2017; Blasi et al., 2003; Culpepper and Blubaugh 2002; Pendleton 2006; 
Kaarsemaker et al. 2009; Robinson and Wilson 2006; Kruse 2016). It is believed that 
these processes will lead to enhanced organisational performance (Bryson and 
Freeman 2010; Kruse et al. 2012; Kalmi et al. 2005; Poutsma and Braam 2012; 
Robinson and Wilson 2006; Sesil and Lin 2011; Sesil and Kroumova 2007).  As a 
result, employee share ownership schemes have been promoted by policy-makers and 
consultants in many countries.   
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Whilst there is widespread evidence that organisations with ESO schemes in place do 
indeed have higher performance (Fernie and Metcalf 1995; McNabb and Whitfield 
1998; Pendleton and Robinson 2010; Sengupta 2008; Kruse and Krutulus 2017), there 
is considerable debate as to how share ownership plans promote these favourable 
effects.  Several explanations can be found in the literature.  Possibly the most 
common explanation is what has been a “golden path” approach.  This suggests that 
ESO schemes have their main impact upon performance through improving affective 
commitment (employees’ emotional attachment to, identification with and 
involvement in the organisation).  An alternative view suggests that share ownership 
schemes are primarily an effective worker retention tool, and reduce labour turnover 
by making it financially lucrative for workers to remain in the firm and costly to exit 
(Marsden 1999; Morris et al. 2006).  Labour retention facilitates the development of 
human capital within the firm, leading to higher levels of employee and organisational 
performance.  This has been called the “golden handcuffs” hypothesis.   
 
The most common theoretical perspective in the ESO literature has drawn on 
principal-agent theory, suggesting that employee share schemes align the interests of 
workers with those of their firms.  However, a widely recognised limitation is the 1/n 
or ‘free rider’ problem that applies to all group incentives.  To counter this, it has been 
argued that ESO needs to operate in conjunction with employee involvement and 
participation in decisions (Kruse and Weitzman 1990).  A synergistic relationship 
between ESO and these other forms of involvement have therefore been widely 
predicted, and there is evidence to support this.  Finally, more recent contributions 
have highlighted the synergistic combination of ESO and training.  Here it is argued 
that ESO can potentially signal mutual commitment and therefore encourage 
employers to offer training to employees (Pendleton and Robinson 2011; Blasi et al. 
2016).   
 
The Workplace Employment Relations Surveys of 2004 and 2011 provide good 
opportunities to examine these alternative processes through which employee share 
ownership can influence performance. Furthermore, enhancements to the employee 
ownership questions in the 2004 and 2011 surveys enable a more precise evaluation 
of the role of share ownership than in preceding WERS surveys by listing specific 
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share-ownership schemes, thereby allowing a more accurate representation of whether 
a workplace has such a scheme or not.       
 
This paper evaluates the various ways that ESO is predicted to impact on workplace 
performance, and provides a comparative assessment of these routes.  It provides 
indications of both contrasts and continuities with earlier results.  In contrast to results 
from 1998, ESO is seen to have no significant relationship with labour turnover in 
either 2004 or 2011.  Similar to studies using the 1998 data, however, there is 
evidence of synergy between ESO and downward communication, though this is 
stronger in 2004 than 2011.  Upward participation is seen to have no independent or 
moderator effects on performance, echoing earlier studies.  Finally, there is some 
modest evidence of synergies between levels of training and ESO in 2004, but this 
disappears by 2011. It is also clear that the effects of ESO are less potent in 2011.  It 
seems that the recession of 2008-9 may have been important here.  It is noteworthy 
too that the coverage of ESO is considerably lower in 2011 than 2004: the proportion 
of private sector workplaces with ESO fell from 19% to 10% per cent.  The paper 
makes a contribution by updating earlier analysis of ESO using WERS and also by 
systematically comparing the role of potential moderators which, hitherto, have been 
evaluated separately.    
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Employee share ownership plans provide a means for employees to acquire equity in 
their employing firms.  They can take several different forms, including share 
purchase schemes, free share awards, and stock options.  Where shares are purchased, 
or options exercised by employees, it is common for discounts or matching shares to 
be offered by the employer as an incentive to join the plan and to mitigate risk.  In 
many countries, employees participating in share ownership schemes also benefit 
from tax concessions, such as exemption from income tax on the benefit of acquiring 
shares at nil cost or a discount.   The motives for promoting share ownership schemes 
vary between countries but a common objective is to provide employees with an 
incentive to work harder and smarter, by aligning their interests with those of their 
employer, thereby contributing to the improved performance of their company.   
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There has been extensive interest in the organisational impact of employee share 
ownership plans in recent years, especially in the USA and UK (where these schemes 
are particularly widespread).  Most of the empirical evidence has indicated that 
employee share ownership plans have favourable effects on workplace and 
organisational performance (Kruse et al. 2012; Pendleton and Robinson 2010; 
Pendleton 2006; Blasi et al. 2016; Kurtulus and Kruse 2017).  The most common 
explanation for this finding has been located in principal-agent theory and focuses on 
the alignment of worker and organisational interests via share ownership encouraging 
agents (workers) to expend effort to achieve the principal’s objectives. Since workers 
will benefit from high performance by the receipt of shares, dividends based on the 
shares and increases in the market value of the shares, they have an incentive to aim 
for high levels of performance.  Although research in the economics tradition has 
typically been silent on the psychological processes involved, there is nevertheless an 
extensive body of literature on the impact of ESO on employee attitudes and 
behaviour. Commencing with the late Richard Long towards the end of the 1970s 
(Long 1978a), this literature has either compared the attitudes and behaviour of share-
owners/scheme-participants against non-participants within firms, across firms, and 
before and after scheme implementation.   
 
This literature typically focuses on the effects of share ownership on the identification 
with and commitment of employees to their organisations.  Long (1978a), for example, 
argued that share-ownership increases organisational identification, which in turn has 
a positive impact upon firm performance. Rhodes and Steer’s (1981) comparative 
analysis of a worker-owned firm and a conventional firm in the plywood industry in 
the US reported higher commitment levels in the former.  Furthermore, Pierce et al. 
(1991) and Pendleton et al. (1998) have drawn attention to the notion of psychological 
ownership, or feelings of ownership which, if present, can be expected to lead to 
higher commitment.   
 
Not all of the evidence, however, has been so supportive.  Gamble et al (2002) found 
lower levels of commitment amongst employee shareholders, whilst other studies 
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have found small and insignificant differences between share plan participants and 
non-participants (Baddon et al 1989); Dewe et al 1990). Sengupta et al. (2007) found 
little evidence of a relationship between employee share schemes and organisational 
commitment.  Some studies have suggested that schemes need to generate financial 
returns to employees (French and Rosenstein 1984; Buchko 1992) or provide 
employees with a role in decision-making (Blasi et al. 2008; Dube and Freeman 2010; 
Kruse et al. 2012; Sengupta 2008) to be effective. Others argued that these schemes 
should co-exist with High Performance Work Practices (employee involvement, job 
security and training) to be effective (Kruse et al. 2010; Kurulus and Kruse 2017; 
Pendleton and Robinson 2010).    
 
A more general problem with the literature on the posited attitudinal effects of 
employee share ownership is that it is extremely difficult to demonstrate linkages with 
organisational performance, even where there is strong evidence of positive 
relationships between ESO and employee attitudes (Pendleton et al. 1998).   The 
range and levels of data necessary to systematically and convincingly demonstrate 
linkages between ESO and performance via the mediating role of employee attitudes 
has not been readily available.  The British Workplace Employment Relations 
Surveys (WERS) have the range of workplaces to do this, and an employee survey 
linked to the workplace survey. However, since the employee survey does not observe 
share ownership any attempt  to link ESO directly to commitment has to be treated 
with great caution.   
 
For this reason, much of the research on the effects of ESO that uses the WERS 
surveys focuses directly on relationships between ESO and performance outcomes, 
and of mediating and moderating factors related to other organisational practices, 
rather than on the attitudinal states that ESO may bring about.  In terms of the direct 
relationship between ESO and performance, the predominant approach draws on 
principal-agent theory to emphasise the potential alignment of employee and company 
interests.  Against this, ESO clearly has some limitations.  The potential for a free-
rider effect may limit performance effects whilst transferring risk may impose some 
costs on employers (risk premiums).  Most of the evidence from studies directly 
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evaluating the links between ESO and performance finds positive effects of ESO 
(Bryson and Freeman 2010; Kaarsemaker et al.2009; Kruse et al. 2012; Kalmi et al. 
2005; Poutsma and Braam 2012; Robinson and Wilson 2006; Sesil and Lin 2011; 
Sesil and Kroumova 2007; Blasi et al. 2016). A recent meta-analysis of 102 studies, 
representing over 56,000 firms, found that employee ownership has a small but 
positive and statistically significant relation to firm performance (O’Boyle et al 2016).  
Focusing more narrowly on the WERS studies in the UK, conducted periodically 
since 1980, a series of studies have shown positive relationships between the use of 
ESO plans and workplace productivity and performance over the years (Blanchflower 
and Oswald, 1987; Gregg and Machin 1988; Fernie and Metcalf 1995; Pendleton 
1997; Heywood et al 1997; McNabb and Whitfield 1998; Addison and Belfield 2000; 
Robinson and Zhang 2005; Sengupta 2008).  
 
Based on these previous findings, coupled with the theoretical basis for predicting 
positive outcomes of ESO schemes, we propose: 
 
H1.       Workplaces with employee share ownership schemes will exhibit higher 
levels of performance than those without. 
 
Although the discussion above does not consider the means by which employee share 
ownership may affect performance, it is nevertheless pertinent to enquire about the 
means through which such an outcome may be realised.  Leaving aside the potential 
effects of ESO on employee attitudes, which cannot be directly tested using WERS, it 
is possible that ESO works through changes in employee behaviour (observed at the 
workplace rather than individual level).  One approach suggests that share-ownership 
schemes function primarily as a worker retention tool, and reduce labour turnover by 
making it financially lucrative for workers to remain in the firm and costly to leave it 
(Marsden 1999; Morris et al. 2006; Pendleton and Robinson 2011).  Such an approach 
has been dubbed the “golden handcuffs hypothesis” (Sengupta et al. 2007). Share 
ownership plans typically have deferral characteristics which mean that the value of a 
particular tranche of shares is typically not realised for three to five years.  In the UK 
Save-As-You-Earn (SAYE) scheme, for example, employees can sign-up for options 
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and saving schemes of three or five years duration, and do not receive any shares, 
should they choose to exercise the options, until then.   Although participants in the 
Share Incentive Plan (SIP) become beneficial owners of their shares straight away, 
they are held in trust for at least three years.  In many companies, any free or 
matching shares that are acquired through the Share Incentive Plan are forfeited if the 
employee leaves without good reason within three years.  In the case of the Company 
Share-Ownership Plan (CSOP), options cannot be exercised until three years have 
elapsed.   
 
The mechanics of share plans, then, serve to lock-in employees to the firm offering 
the share plan.  Furthermore, in so far as grants of shares or options boost total wages 
above labour market norms, share plans can make it costly for employees to leave 
their employment.  There is also a further reverse possibility in that, if employees 
select into optional share plans, share plan participation can reflect a reduced 
propensity to exit (Ewan and Macpherson : 2005).         
 
There have been relatively few studies of the relationship between share plans and 
labour turnover, though the evidence is generally supportive of an inverse relationship 
(Fernie and Metcalf 1995; Wilson et al 1990; Robinson and Wilson 2006).  Other 
studies have found a reduced propensity to quit when data has been collected at the 
employee level (Blasi et al. 2008; Rhodes and Steer 1981), though Gamble et al 
(2002) found lower levels of behavioural commitment (intention to stay in the firm) 
amongst share plan participants.  In the most recent study of ESO and turnover, using 
the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey, Sengupta et al. (2007) found a 
significant negative relationship between share plan presence and labour turnover. On 
this basis we advance our second hypothesis: 
 
H2.  Workplaces with share-ownership schemes will have lower turnover rates, 
other things being equal. 
 
A critical issue is why lower levels of employee turnover might be associated with 
higher levels of organisational performance.  Lower levels of employee turnover, 
encourage greater firm-specific and general human capital investment which 
contributes towards greater labour productivity and subsequently higher financial 
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performance (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 2003; Richardson and Nejad, 1986). Sengupta et 
al (2007) found considerable support for these propositions.  Employee share 
ownership had a significant negative effect on labour turnover.  When the relationship 
between ESO and performance was tested, a significant positive effect was observed: 
moreover, when the fitted values from the turnover regression were inserted into the 
performance equation, the employee share ownership coefficient fell, whilst the 
residual inserted from the labour turnover regression was significant in the predicted 
direction.  As a result, it can be anticipated that any positive association between 
share-ownership and performance would be lower in analyses where the impact of 
turnover had been allowed for, reflecting the mediating influence of the latter.   
 
This is expressed in our third hypothesis: 
 
H3.  Part of any positive association between share-ownership and performance 
can be attributed to a negative impact of share-ownership on labour turnover.  
 
An alternative approach to investigation of the ways in which ESO affects workplace 
or company performance focuses on the moderating effects of other human resource 
practices (Kaarsemaker and Poutsma 2006).  This is based on the notion that practices 
will complement each other and that performance will benefit from these synergies.  
The ESO literature has focused on two main sets of potential complements to ESO: 
training and employee involvement in decision-making.   Of the two, training is the 
less common and has been the subject of analysis only comparatively recently.  Most 
of the limited literature in this area has been published since 2000. 
 
Recent WERS-based studies have shown that employee share ownership is associated 
with higher levels of training within the firm (Pendleton and Robinson 2011; 
Robinson and Zhang 2005).  A study based on the French REPONSE survey has 
shown that relatively high levels of training expenditure within the establishment have 
a positive impact on the introduction of ESO plans (Guery and Pendleton 2016) 
 
There are also grounds for anticipating that there will be a synergistic effect of 
training and ESO on performance.  This is based on the ‘lock-in’ capabilities of share 
plans, and the capacity of share plan provision by management, along with 
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involvement in the plans by employees, and reciprocal signals about commitment. 
Managers signal that they will not expropriate all the gains from training, whilst 
employees show that they will remain with the firm, thereby mitigating the risks for 
management of investing in training  
 
Based on this reasoning we hypothesise that  
 
H4.       Training will moderate the relationship between ESO and performance.    
A long-standing perspective in the ESO literature argues that ESO will be more 
effective when combined with forms of employee participation in decision-making.  
Analyses of such forms of participation generally identify a broad range of employee 
involvement practices, ranging from the provision of information by managers over 
and above a hypothetical minimum, through to a capacity or opportunity for 
employees to influence management decisions. The moderation effect of such 
practices is theoretically under-pinned by the weaknesses of agency theory in 
accounting for incentive effects of ESO.  Since ESO is a group incentive, in theory its 
effectiveness may be undermined by the 1/n issue.   It is argued that combining ESO 
with various other forms of employee involvement will counter the 1/n effect by 
showing over time (‘repeated games’) that effort and commitment are worthwhile 
(Kruse and Weitzman 1990) and, if this fails to work, there is the potential for peer 
pressure via the institutions of employee involvement (Kruse et al 2010).  There is 
also a strain of literature, beginning with the ‘bundles’ literature in the 1990s (e.g. 
MacDuffie, 1995), that argues that HRM practices will be more effective if they 
present a consistent approach to HRM (Ostroff and Bowen 2000).  On this basis, 
provision of greater information is consistent with the use of share ownership 
schemes, which require communication to employees on scheme details and share 
price performance. 
WERS-based research over the years has provided partial support for these 
suppositions.  Using the 1990 survey (WERS3), McNabb and Whitfield (1998) found 
that the effects of downward communication (brieﬁng groups/team brieﬁng, regular 
meetings between senior managers and the workforce, and regular newsletters) on 
financial performance was greater when operated in tandem with financial 
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participation schemes in place (including employee share-ownership). Share 
ownership workplaces had positive effects on financial performance when combined 
with downward communication, but negative effects when these forms of downward 
communication were absent.  By contrast, there were no effects on financial 
performance of operating upward forms of communication (quality circles and 
suggestion schemes), or representative participation (joint consultative committees).  
A replication of the McNabb and Whitfield study by Addison and Belfield using 1998 
WERS generated rather different results.  Share ownership was more likely to have a 
positive effect on financial performance when upward communication was absent, 
indicating the opposite of complementarities, whilst share ownership had more or less 
similar effects on performance irrespective of the presence or absence of downward 
communication.  Representative participation continued to have no effects.  The 
implication of this is that share ownership plans impacted on performance in their 
own right.   
Pendleton and Robinson (2010) found that share ownership had a positive relationship 
with above average levels of labour productivity in its own right especially where 
there were high levels of involvement in the share scheme.  Downward 
communication could add to these effects whereas upward communication weakened 
the marginal effects of the share ownership scheme. 
Based on these findings from various versions of the WERS survey we hypothesise 
the following: 
H5 The combination of employee share ownership plans and downward 
communication schemes will have positive effects on workplace performance. 
H6 The combination of employee share ownership plans and upward 
communication schemes will have no significant effects on workplace performance 
 
METHODS 
Data. The analysis uses the workplace-level surveys (‘the Management 
Questionnaire’) from the 2004 and 2011 Workplace Employee Relations Surveys. 
The WERS data-sets provide comprehensive information on a nationally-
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representative sample of firms in Britain. The Management Questionnaire was based 
on face-to-face interviews with senior managers in 2,295 establishments (response 
rate 64%) in 2004 and 2,680 (response rate 46.3%) in 2011. Data on the 
establishments include information on their structural characteristics, management 
employment practices, product markets, labour force composition and the nature of 
their collective employment relations.   
 
The overall approach to test the hypotheses is to examine the effects of ESO on labour 
turnover, labour productivity, and financial performance in both years of observation, 
controlling for relevant characteristics such as sector and workplace size.   Insertion of 
the fitted values derived from labour turnover regressions into performance 
regressions enables us to evaluate the moderating role of turnover.  Then, we evaluate 
the potential moderating effects of upward involvement, downward communications, 
and training. 
 
Defining Employee Share-ownership. The employee share ownership measure records 
the presence of an employee share ownership plan that is available to employees in 
the workplace.  It takes the value 1 if any of the specified ESO plans in the survey are 
present in the workplace, 0 otherwise.  It is a somewhat blunt measure of ESO but this 
form is adopted to permit comparability with the earlier studies of ESO, which also 
use a simple presence dummy.  Two of the tax-approved schemes included in the 
measure are all-employee schemes, which are required to be open to all eligible 
employees (typically those with one year’s tenure but sometimes less).  The third is a 
discretionary scheme, which companies can restrict to selected employees, but most 
workplaces with these schemes operated them as all-employee schemes (Pendleton 
2007).  
The percentage of private sector workplaces with share ownership plans in 2004 was 
19%, more or less the same as in 1998 (Kersley et al. 2006).  However, the incidence 
had fallen to 10% by 2011 (van Wanrooy et al. 2013).  
Turnover Variable. The turnover variable is based on a question asked of the manager 
most responsible for personnel about the number of permanent employees who 
stopped working at the workplace in the last five years because they resigned 
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voluntarily. The variable used in the analysis is the turnover rate - the number of 
permanent employees leaving the workplace divided by the number of permanent 
employees at the time of the survey.  The variable is expressed in logarithmic form 
(natural log) to reflect bunching at one end of the distribution. 
 
Performance Variables. In both WERS2004 and WERS2011, the measures of 
performance are qualitative, and are derived from manager assessments of what is 
happening in their own establishment relative to what they believe is happening in 
other establishments in the same industry. Two dimensions of performance are 
considered, financial performance and labour productivity. The variables used in the 
performance analyses are binary, taking the value “1” if the workplace has above 
average performance and “0” otherwise. Though both surveys allow the option of 
using objective measures of performance the preference was to rely on the subjective 
performance measures for several reasons. First, several studies have validated the 
reliability of the subjective performance measures (Machin and Stewart 1996; Wall et 
al. 2004). Second, the objective performance measures were available for only around 
40 per cent of workplaces in comparison to the subjective performance measures that 
were available for 2,295 workplaces, thereby restricting the sample size considerable. 
Besides, the subjective measures are a useful alternative to objective performance 
measures which have limitations of their own (Machin and Stewart, 1996).  
 
The moderating variables are based on these used in McNabb and Whitfield (1998), 
which in turn were based on well-established conceptualisations in the literature.  
Upward involvement is a composite dummy variable recording the presence of either 
quality circles, problem-solving groups, or suggestion schemes.  It does not include 
representative forms of involvement in decisions or formal means for influencing 
management decisions such as consultative committees (previous analyses of ESO 
have found these have no effects on workplace performance).   Downward 
communication records the presence of team briefings, newsletters, and meetings held 
by senior managers with all employees.  The training variable records how much off-
the-job training is offered to members of the largest occupational group in the 
workplace, with the value set at 1 where employees receive 5 days or more each year, 
0 otherwise.   We experimented with an alternative measure of training, based on the 
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proportion of employees who receive training each year, but the results were not 
materially different, and hence are not reported here. 
 
Statistical Methods.  All of the analysis is based on a sub-set of the WERS workplaces 
– those that are to be found in the private trading sector (n = 635 in 2004, 653 in 
2011).  This provides continuity with earlier analyses against which the results are 
compared.  All regressions utilise the workplace weights supplied with the WERS 
data, and include a vector of control variables based on previous research in the area. 
Since the dependent variables are binomial, the performance regressions use probit 
analysis, whilst the regression of quits on ESO uses ordinary least squares (OLS) 
analysis.  The moderation analysis is conducted using interaction terms which, since 
they are based on dummies, take a categorical form.  As the dependent variables are 
binomial, this obviates the need to plot the values of the interaction terms at each level 
of the dependent variable, and hence the main results are relatively straightforward to 
present      
 
 
RESULTS 
Share Ownership and Performance.  The baseline results for the performance 
relationships are presented in Tables 1 and 2.   The first of these tables presents results 
for ESO and labour productivity, whilst the second displays the results for ESO and 
financial performance.  The headline result is that, controlling for sector, size and 
various other forms of employee participation, ESO has a significant positive 
relationship with both labour productivity, consistent with other studies in this area 
(Pendleton and Robinson 2010), and financial performance in 2004.  However, in 
2011, ESO has significant relationships with neither labour productivity nor financial 
performance, interrupting a tradition of observed positive associations of ESO dating 
back to the 1990 WIRS.  The coefficients for upward involvement downward 
communication, and for training, are mostly insignificant in these models.   
 
TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
On the basis of these results, we judge H1 to be partially supported.   
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Hypothesis 2 proposes that workplaces with ESO will have lower levels of turnover 
than those without, after controlling for other workplace characteristics that may be 
associated with labour turnover.  The results for the regressions evaluating the 
relationship between ESO and turnover are found in Table 3.   
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results presented in Table 3 suggest that there is a negative, but insignificant, 
relationship between employee share ownership and employee turnover, other 
relevant factors being controlled for. The possibility that the lower levels of employee 
turnover in share ownership establishments are attributable to the high wages paid in 
these establishments (Renaud et al. 2004; Blair and Kruse 1999) is tested by 
controlling for the proportion of full-time employees earning below £9000 pa and 
above £29000 pa.  Neither variable is significant at the ten per cent level.  
 
On the basis of these results, it is safe to conclude that Hypothesis 2 is not supported.  
The suggestion therefore that the often-found positive relationship between share 
ownership and performance could result from its influence on the quit-rate, by helping 
the firm to economise on hiring/firing costs and protecting valuable investments in 
firm specific human capital, is not supported by these results.  There seems to be little 
evidence of ESO functioning as ‘golden handcuffs’ (Sengupta et al, 2007).     
 
Hypothesis 3, that the performance effect of ESO operates in part via lower labour 
turnover, becomes somewhat redundant given the results above.  However, for 
completeness we report the results for regressions of performance on ESO with the 
residual values from the labour turnover regressions inserted. In this way, we are 
controlling for the indirect effect of share ownership on performance via its effect on 
employee turnover. The coefficients on share ownership then measure the direct or 
net effect on performance. 
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Unsurprisingly, the fitted values have insignificant effects on labour productivity and 
financial performance in both years, and the ESO coefficients changes little from 
those reported in Tables 1 and 2.  Hypothesis 3 is therefore not supported. 
 
Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 make a series of predictions about the moderating effects of 
other HRM practices.  The extent of moderation is shown using interaction terms 
whereby the variables of interest are multiplied by the ESO variable.  The results are 
presented for both years of observation in Tables 4 and 5.  The first of these reports 
results for labour productivity, whilst the second presents those for financial 
performance.  The first column for each year presents the coefficients for the 
constituent variables of the interaction term, whilst the second column presents the 
coefficients for the interaction term and the constituent items once the interaction term 
has been inserted.   
 
PLEASE PLACE TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Looking at labour productivity first in Table3, the moderation of ESO by downward 
communication is strongly significant, with the ESO constituent term becoming 
significantly negative in 2004.  This suggests that the positive effects of ESO are 
concentrated in cases where there is also downward communication.  ESO on its own, 
without downward communication, has negative effects on productivity.  A positive 
interaction effect is also observed in 2011, alongside a negative effect of ESO when 
communication is absent.  
 
Neither upward involvement nor training have significant moderating effects on the 
effects of ESO on labour productivity, in either 2004 or 2011.  The upward 
involvement results are consistent with those observed in earlier analyses including 
those using 2004.  The results for training are more novel but, in conjunction with the 
labour turnover results, they provide little support for those theoretical perspectives 
emphasising the role of ESO in developing human capital. 
 
 18 
In Table 5 the results for the moderating effects of upward involvement, downward 
communication, and training in relation to financial performance are less clear-cut 
than those relating to labour productivity.  The interaction terms for ESO and 
downward communication, and for training and ESO, are positive and significant in 
2004 but there are no positive moderation effects in 2011. 
 
On the basis of these results we can claim that H4 (training) is partially supported, H5 
(downward communication) is supported except for financial performance in 2011, 
and H6 (upward involvement) is not supported in any instance.   
 
Summarising these results, the following claims can be made.  ESO has positive 
performance effects on both labour productivity and financial performance in 2004 
but not 2011, suggesting that the effects of ESO have weakened over time or because 
of some event or changes that have occurred between 2004 and 2011.  There is no 
evidence of ESO reducing labour turnover, and hence it is unlikely that the positive 
effects of ESO observed in 2004 are secured via this route.  Thus the ‘golden 
handcuffs’ perspective is not supported.  Finally, there is evidence consistent with the 
earlier WERS studies that ESO has a synergistic relationship with downward 
communication but not upward involvement.  As for training, there is not a great deal 
of evidence for the view, recently expressed in the literature, that ESO may achieve its 
effects via a synergistic relationship with employer-provided training. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATION AND LIMITATIONS 
The findings in this paper contribute to the academic debate on ESO and performance 
in a number of ways. In many respects, our findings add weight to the scepticism, 
voiced by Tom Redman, about the power of share-ownership to leverage high 
organisational performance, either in its own right or in combination with other HR 
practices. Primarily, it challenges conventional wisdom that ESO schemes impact 
upon performance by acting as an effective retention tool by making it more lucrative 
for employees to remain with the firm. These findings call into question the findings 
from the previous research using the WERS 98 dataset (Sengupta et al. 2007). Instead, 
attention is diverted to the contingency argument which emphasises the importance of 
the presence of supportive workplace practices that need to be in place (such as 
 19 
employee involvement, job security, training and low supervision). However, only 
some practices seem to have this effect.  It is further argued that without such 
supportive policies employee share ownership schemes may have lower satisfaction 
and higher employee turnover (Kruse 2016). Employee share ownership schemes 
without the presence of supportive workplace policies may be viewed as an attempt to 
shift financial risk onto the workers rather than to empower them (Kruse 2016; Kruse 
et al. 2010; Kruse and Krutulus 2017).  
 
These effects are likely to be more pronounced during recession. We find 
insignificant associations with labour productivity and financial performance for 
WERS 2011. This finding is consistent with the view that during recession the relative 
productivity advantage of ESO firms declines because employee ownership firms lay 
off fewer workers during recession. The lack of higher productivity may be due to 
retaining workers who receive new training or otherwise invest in activities that 
bolster long-term but not short-term productivity (Kruse 2016:5). This finding also 
lends further support to the evidence which shows that the economic conditions could 
impact labour productivity in ESO firms (Kim and Patel 2016), thus drawing attention 
to the role of contextual factors in shaping ESO effectiveness.    
 
The findings also have implications for managerial practitioners and companies 
considering the implementation of a share scheme. The results would enable them to 
have a more realistic view of the expected benefits and the costs associated with the 
different types of share ownership schemes, thereby influencing their decision on 
whether to invest in a share scheme. The findings have implications for policy-makers 
who determine the incentives that should be given to encourage companies to adopt 
share ownership schemes. When the mere existence of share schemes is no guarantee 
for boosting organisational performance, bringing about a more equitable distribution 
of wealth, policy-makers may wish to reconsider whether or not to encourage their 
adoption or to advocate tax breaks. 
 
Some caution must, however, be applied to the conclusions reached in this study. This 
particularly applies to the cross–sectional nature of the data-set and the potential for 
reverse causality especially regarding financial performance. The problem of causality 
can be addressed by using panel data, or by designing longitudinal studies with 
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different samples.  Qualitative data could add value by providing insights into the 
causal processes. A case is thereby made for encouraging a tradition of collaborative 
research employing both quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques. We hope 
that Tom would have approved. 
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Table One: Probit Analysis of Employee Share Ownership and Labour 
Productivity 
Independent and Control Variables WERS2004 WERS2011 
   
Presence of Share-Ownership  .451** -.004 
   
Establishment Characteristics   
Recognised union at establishment -.089 .033 
Level of technology: Percentage of 
unskilled workers 
-.182 -.055 
Establishment age: >20 years -.035 .201 
Number of employees (multiplied by 
1000) 
.008 -.003 
Establishment status: Independent 
establishment 
.563*** .156 
   
Sectors:   
Manufacturing -.543 .027 
Public Administration -.064 -.635 
Education -1.038* .440 
Health  -.326 .136 
Electricity, gas and water -.115 -1.33*** 
Construction -.818 .742 
Wholesale and retail -.328 .420 
Hotels and restaurants -.205 .366 
Transport and communications -.218 .588 
Financial services -.970* .490 
Other business services -.445 .131 
   
Market characteristics:   
Market growth .163 -.026 
International market .353* .418* 
Product market competition (high 
competition for main product or services) 
-.209 -.091 
 
Human Resource Practices 
  
Upward Communication 
 
-.118 .037 
Downward Communication -.173 
 
.878* 
Training .202 
 
.143 
Constant .289 -1.06* 
Number of observations 635 653 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.07 0.04 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 28 
 
Table Two: Probit Analysis of Employee Share Ownership and Financial 
Performance 
Independent and Control Variables WERS2004 WERS2011 
   
Presence of Share-Ownership 
 
 .604*** .283 
Establishment Characteristics   
Recognised union at establishment -.429* .076 
Level of technology: Percentage of 
unskilled workers 
 .017 -.243 
Establishment age: >20 years  .005 .282 
Number of employees (multiplied by 1000)  .002 .009 
Establishment status: Independent 
establishment 
 .003 -.233 
   
Sectors:   
Manufacturing -.118 .406 
Public Administration -.184 .617 
Education -.539 .302 
Health   .257 ..484 
Electricity, gas and water  .723 -.742 
Construction  .092 .364 
Wholesale and retail -.027 ..796** 
Hotels and restaurants  .657 .696 
Transport and communications  .554 1.03*** 
Financial services   .206 1.39*** 
Other business services -.394 .603** 
   
Market characteristics:   
Market growth .298* .097 
International market -.063 .065 
Product market competition (high 
competition for main product or services) 
-.452*** -.189 
   
Human Resource Practices:   
Upward Communication  .044 -.231 
Downward Communication -.212 .253 
Training  .238 -.174 
   
Constant  .305 -.719 
   
Number of observations  635 653 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.09 0.06 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table Three: Least Squares Analysis of Employee Turnover 
   
 WERS2004 WERS2011 
Independent and Control Variables Coefficient Coefficient 
   
   
Presence of share-ownership -.003 -.056 
   
Sectors:   
Manufacturing -.203 -.139 
Public Administration -.366 -2.245*** 
Education -.238 -.-.555*** 
Health and Social Work  .031 -.381*** 
Electricity, gas and water -1.062*** .315 
Construction  .574** -.351* 
Wholesale and retail  .242 -.175 
Hotels and restaurants  .261 .-.917*** 
Transport and communications -.124 .098 
Financial services  .011 -.552* 
Other business services  .132 -.129 
   
Establishment Characteristics   
Number of employees (multiplied by 1000)  .008*** .001* 
Establishment status: Independent establishment -.091 -.097 
Private sector -.333 -.374 
Recognised union at establishment -.436*** -.449 
Procedures dealing with collective disputes  .016 -.075 
Proportion of part-time workers  .350* .307* 
Proportion of female workers -.341* .374* 
Proportion of ethnic workers  .422* .102 
Proportion of workers aged under 21  .454** -.116 
% full-time employees earning <£9000 p.a -.240 .051 
% full-time employees earning >£29000 p.a -.402** .-.193 
   
Human Resource Practices   
Upward Communication  .080 -.132 
Downward Communication  .188 .077 
Training  -.061 .178 
   
Constant -1.566*** -1.62*** 
   
Number of observations  635 653 
R-squared 0.24 0.21 
*Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table Four: Probit Analysis of Employee Share Ownership and Labour 
Productivity: Moderation Analysis  
   
 
 
WERS 
2004 
WERS 
2004 
WERS 
2011 
WERS 
2011 
     
Presence of Share-Ownership 
(ESO) 
 0.451** -4.378*** 
 
-0.004 -4.784*** 
 
Training  0.203   0.143  0.255 
     
Upward involvement -0.118   0.037  0.005 
     
Downward communication -0.173   0.878*  0.682 
     
ESO * training 
 
  0.569 
 
 -0.496 
 
ESO * upward involvement 
 
 -0.305  
 
  0.175 
 
ESO * downward 
communication 
 
  4.859*** 
 
  4.935*** 
 
Quits 
 
 -0.317  
 
  0.097  
 
     
N  635   635   653  653 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07   0.08   0.04  0.05 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 
Note: Same control variables have been included in the regression model as for regressions 
reported in Tables One and Two, but are not shown here. 
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Table Five: Probit Analysis of Employee Share Ownership and Financial 
Performance: Moderation Analysis  
   
 
 
WERS 
2004 
WERS 
2004 
WERS 
2011 
WERS 
2011 
     
Presence of Share-Ownership 
(ESO) 
 0.604*** -3.688*** 
 
 0.284 
 
 0.979 
 
     
Training  0.238 -0.004 -0.174 -0.060 
     
Upward involvement  0.044  0.068 -0.231 -0.327 
     
Downward communication -0.212 -0.152  0.253 
 
 0.427 
ESO * training 
 
  1.251**   0.118 
 
ESO * upward involvement 
 
 -0.072  -0.123 
 
ESO * downward 
communication 
  3.948*** 
 
 -0.799 
 
     
Quits  -0.021  -0.780 
     
N  635  635  653  653 
Pseudo R-squared  0.09  0.11  0.06  0.07 
 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level 
 
Note: Same control variables have been included in the regression model as for regressions 
reported in Tables One and Two, but are not shown here. 
 
